In this culminating chapter of The Order of Things, Foucault explains the development of the Western episteme, or the body of ideas that influence knowledge and the perception of the world within a specific historical context. His intent, more specifically, is to trace the changes in the configurations of knowledge from the Classical period to the modern period, which allowed, and even required, the development of the modern conception of man. This modern conception of man is what Foucault terms the “empirico-transcendental subject,” one who is confined by the limitations (the finitude) of his experiences and his perceptions, but at the same time is able to examine how he perceives and knows what he does. He explains this knowledge of “man” as fundamentally different from all other systems of knowledge throughout history, and describes the order of the human sciences that made it possible. Finally, at the end of all this, Foucault argues that the episteme surrounding the modern conception of man is beginning to give way, and that once it does, our present idea of man will itself fade away. Let us first start with his description of the shift that gave way to the modern episteme.
Foucault describes the order of the Classical sciences as being one of formalisms, classifications, and “long chains of order that...create a path leading necessarily form the very simplest and most evident of ideas to the most composite truths” (346). However, he says, at the beginning of the 19th century, the field of knowledge lost this unity of the establishment of order, and in fact branched out into three different areas: the deductive sciences, the empirical sciences, and philosophical reflection. These three dimensions interacted to form what Foucault titles the “epistemological trihedron” (347). The human sciences, not to be confused with the empirical sciences, exist within “the volume defined by [the] three dimensions” (347). They borrow forms, techniques, and domains from the three configurations of knowledge, but take as their object the peculiar ability of man to know. The concept of man as a finite being who is able to create representations of the things and processes in the world around him, and eventually is able to represent that world and that life itself, becomes the great problem of the human sciences. They must study not man’s nature, but, “an analysis that extends from what man is in his positivity (living, speaking, laboring being) to what enables this same being to know what life is, in what the essence of labor and its laws consist, and in what way he is able to speak” (353). This is what constitutes the fundamental difference between the human and empirical sciences, and gives them their “‘ana-’ or ‘hypo-epistemological’ position” (355).
Foucault then goes on to describe the three surface models of the human sciences: psychology, sociology, and literary analysis/myths. He says that they more or less divide up the realm of human knowledge, but that they do not solve the problem of “the form of positivity” (356), or the structures which make them function as knowledge; nor the “relation to representation” (356), by which he means the problem of reconciling representation and unconscious mechanisms. He therefore goes about describing the “particular arrangement in the epistemological space” (356), and more specifically, the models taken from empirical sciences and transferred to human sciences, thus creating different categories. These models are function/norm, conflict/rule, and signification/system, taken from biology, economics, and the study of language, respectively, and all of which interact within the human sciences. He describes a great shift in these models, centered on Freud and psychoanalysis, and consisting in a change of emphasis from the first term in each pair to the second. This shift brings in the problem of how unconsciousness, or “unthought,” can create representation, and thus the examination can illuminate the possibility of human knowledge. The human sciences are inherently based upon representation, and thus they constantly examine the basis of knowledge, which, in turn, serves as their own basis. Foucault therefore answers the question of how “scientific” the human sciences are by saying they are not sciences at all, but merely “other configurations of knowledge” (366), within the modern episteme that necessarily result from its structure.
Foucault then moves on to write of the complex relation between history and the human sciences. From the Classical conception of history, in which a “vast historical stream” carried everything along, the 19th century destroyed this unity, so that forms of nature, and even human processes themselves, had their own historicity and their own development independent of any general flow. However, with the foundation of these various histories, he says that the modern age became aware of the historicity of the concept of man himself, or the idea that “man as such is exposed to the event” (370). History becomes defined through different interpretations using the human sciences, because we now have the concept of the man who carries out certain processes, but it also means that the human sciences must lose their claim to universality, because they in turn are determined by their own history.
Finally, Foucault moves on to analyze the particular modes of psychoanalysis and ethnology in the system of knowledge, because of the fact that both are able to elude representation and instead speak on a more fundamental level as to what makes representation itself possible. For psychoanalysis, he says that Freud’s three figures of Death, Desire, and Law form the basis for all knowledge about man, the unconscious finitudes that represent the limits of human knowledge. On the other hand, ethnology represents a way of figuring out the rules of knowledge, and thus figuring out the laws by which the human sciences establish themselves within a specific historical context. Psychoanalysis represents a way past representation by looking towards those “outer confines of representation” (378), whereas ethnology eludes representation by looking at the relations of the West with other cultures, and by doing so, understanding the norms, rules, and systems that lie underneath all representation. They both form the knowledge of the unconscious. They form the “counter-sciences” (pg. 379), which are the basis of all the human sciences, but at the same time which cannot achieve a conception of the nature of man, and in fact avoid the concept of man himself by examining the limits of knowledge and thinking.
This privileged position allows for a level of interaction between ethnology and psychoanalysis, in which “the structure proper to individual experience finds a certain number of possible choices… in the systems of society; inversely, at each of their points of choice the social structures encounter a certain number of possible individuals” (380). Thus, he develops the idea of a new way of analyzing knowledge, combining limit analysis and the structures that proliferate in society, by which one can analyze the episteme itself. He sees the “formal model” for this form of analysis in language, and goes on to explain the reemergence of the problems of language. This, according to Foucault, is a sign that the whole mode of knowledge in the modern episteme is about to change. With this he concludes that “man” as we know him is simply a manifestation of a particular mode of knowledge, and that with the fall of that mode, man himself will disappear and give way to the analysis of discourse.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Sunday, February 4, 2007
Methodology
More on methodology to come later, as the material was extremely dense and I would like to read it again before offering my thoughts.
Psychology, Power, and Subjectivity
The three articles on "What is Psychology?" by Canguilhem, "The Birth of the Asylum, " and Abnormal by Foucault, illustrate several essential aspects of the critical perspective taken towards psychology. These include: the insubstantial basis of psychology, which nonetheless presents itself as authoritative and exact; the consequences of this shaky foundation when applied to areas such as the law (which transforms the juridical nature of the law almost completely to one of normalization); and the strict moral and psychological confinement given to subjects in "reformed" mental institutions under the guise of greater liberty and humanity. What is remarkable to me is the magnitude of the social critique and condemnation of society's practices (especially in Abnormal), whereas in much of what we have read Foucault remains primarily descriptive and refrains from accusation. Some of this could be due to his first-hand, extremely negative experiences with psychology. However, I also think that there is much truth to the idea that psychology, a very insecure discipline, can be and has been used to much detrimental effect when it is taken as authoritative. Here more than in most places, I agree with Foucault's and Canguilhem's characterizations of its abilities to deceive us and take us in.
In "What is Psychology?", Canguilhem calls into question the coherence of psychology as a discipline, examining different trends to see if he can isolate any one thing that can be seen as a basis for its study and its accountability--as opposed to just a "pact of peaceful coexistence between professionals" (38). He criticizes the conception of the nature of man as a tool in what he deems "instrumentalism." This conception naturally and inevitably leads to application of its principles on real behavior, and in the end those who determine how it is to be applied are no more than "a corporate elite of specialists equipped with a self-appointed mission" (49). Thus, we can see in his views the power of psychology in shaping relations, and its ability to be easily manipulated by those acting on their own prerogatives. This will figure in to a large extent in Foucault's analysis.
Turning to the other two readings, I was interested in a dual process of justice that seemed to be brought out. On the one hand, psychology was used to develop "a psychologico-ethical double" (Abnormal, 16) in the judicial process, and on the other hand used to create an "awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject," ("Asylum," 146) a never-ending cycle of guilt that replaced strict confinement in the mental institution. In some ways these processes could be seen to be connected, as for instance if the psychological double was used to convict someone of a crime and he was then subjected to this treatment. However, I am interested in what seems to me like a description of two different artificial and psychological worlds created on the authority of the psychologist, one internal and one external.
Let's first start with the external world. This construction of psychology replaces the true defendant and the true acts of the crime with a character profile of a delinquent and a picture of minor deviances that seem to progress up to the crime itself. Thus, the crime itself is not judged, the juridical aspect dissolves, and the justice system becomes a system of normalization. All of this is done on the authority of the psychologist, his reputation and his credentials, which deceive the judge, jury, and general public.
Compare this now with the internal world. This takes the constant threat of punishments and corrections from without, and places the system strictly inside of the patient's own mind. Where he seems free and unbounded because of the structure of Pinel's or Tuke's new asylums, he is actually trapped in a never-ending cycle of guilt that was implanted by the psychologist. Once again, where does the psychologist derive his power to do so? By his authority as a moral father-figure, not by any of his specific knowledge of any type of truth in madness.
So we have what seem to be two artificial worlds, one which acts upon the public to create for them a portrait of a delinquent, and one which acts on the mind of a madman to create an internal check that at once controls his behavior and constantly torments him. Both are thoroughly imbued with moral condemnations and their possibilities of normalization. Finally, both are proliferated with the aid of what seems to me a kind of comfort and reassurance in seeing the psychologist as an authority figure or exemplar of moral conduct. Two powerful examples of the possibility for abuse in psychology that Foucault and Canguilhem fight against. It seems to me that the subjectification created by psychology is perhaps one of the most entrenched and powerful processes in the world that Foucault has described. I'm not quite sure if psychology has this much power any more, and once again this could simply be because of the passage of 30 years and the need to reexamine these changing power structures. However, I am sure that Foucault illustrates some compelling reasons why we must constantly be vigilant and analyze those power structures, especially when an inexact science holds a position of power.
In "What is Psychology?", Canguilhem calls into question the coherence of psychology as a discipline, examining different trends to see if he can isolate any one thing that can be seen as a basis for its study and its accountability--as opposed to just a "pact of peaceful coexistence between professionals" (38). He criticizes the conception of the nature of man as a tool in what he deems "instrumentalism." This conception naturally and inevitably leads to application of its principles on real behavior, and in the end those who determine how it is to be applied are no more than "a corporate elite of specialists equipped with a self-appointed mission" (49). Thus, we can see in his views the power of psychology in shaping relations, and its ability to be easily manipulated by those acting on their own prerogatives. This will figure in to a large extent in Foucault's analysis.
Turning to the other two readings, I was interested in a dual process of justice that seemed to be brought out. On the one hand, psychology was used to develop "a psychologico-ethical double" (Abnormal, 16) in the judicial process, and on the other hand used to create an "awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject," ("Asylum," 146) a never-ending cycle of guilt that replaced strict confinement in the mental institution. In some ways these processes could be seen to be connected, as for instance if the psychological double was used to convict someone of a crime and he was then subjected to this treatment. However, I am interested in what seems to me like a description of two different artificial and psychological worlds created on the authority of the psychologist, one internal and one external.
Let's first start with the external world. This construction of psychology replaces the true defendant and the true acts of the crime with a character profile of a delinquent and a picture of minor deviances that seem to progress up to the crime itself. Thus, the crime itself is not judged, the juridical aspect dissolves, and the justice system becomes a system of normalization. All of this is done on the authority of the psychologist, his reputation and his credentials, which deceive the judge, jury, and general public.
Compare this now with the internal world. This takes the constant threat of punishments and corrections from without, and places the system strictly inside of the patient's own mind. Where he seems free and unbounded because of the structure of Pinel's or Tuke's new asylums, he is actually trapped in a never-ending cycle of guilt that was implanted by the psychologist. Once again, where does the psychologist derive his power to do so? By his authority as a moral father-figure, not by any of his specific knowledge of any type of truth in madness.
So we have what seem to be two artificial worlds, one which acts upon the public to create for them a portrait of a delinquent, and one which acts on the mind of a madman to create an internal check that at once controls his behavior and constantly torments him. Both are thoroughly imbued with moral condemnations and their possibilities of normalization. Finally, both are proliferated with the aid of what seems to me a kind of comfort and reassurance in seeing the psychologist as an authority figure or exemplar of moral conduct. Two powerful examples of the possibility for abuse in psychology that Foucault and Canguilhem fight against. It seems to me that the subjectification created by psychology is perhaps one of the most entrenched and powerful processes in the world that Foucault has described. I'm not quite sure if psychology has this much power any more, and once again this could simply be because of the passage of 30 years and the need to reexamine these changing power structures. However, I am sure that Foucault illustrates some compelling reasons why we must constantly be vigilant and analyze those power structures, especially when an inexact science holds a position of power.
Governmentality/Postscript on Control Societies
In the article on governmentality, Foucault traces the transition from a form of government in which the demands of a transcendant sovereign ruled to a form in which the "art of government" and the "political economy" take precedence. His analysis of the trend is at the same time illuminating and obvious. By this I mean that the specific events Foucault chooses to analyze are no big surprise (as for instance the history of sexuality, in which he analyzed different trends than I was expecting, such as the confession). However, the labels and analysis that he provides for this history seem to suggest a perspective of analysis that I never would have seem. Therefore, this article at once seems to bring obvious yet elusive trends to light, and fits well into Foucault's overall theme of offering new ways of looking at societal institutions and the power relations that come with them.
One aspect that caught my interest was the tension Foucault highlights between sovereignty and the art of government, as the latter did not simply replace the latter. He writes, "instead, given that such an art now existed and was spreading, it involved an attempt to see what juridical and institutional form, what foundation in the law, could be given to the sovereignty that characterizes a state" (218). As I was reading this I thought of something like the utilitarian ideas in contrast to the social contract theories. Whereas the former developed an idea of the legitimacy and form of sovereignty abstractly, the latter seem to take the same type of maximization and intensification of desired ends, and to build a system of government off of this. Am I reading this correctly, and is this part of what Foucault is describing?
Another aspect I found interesting was Foucault's analysis of the transition of the family unit from the model of government to "an element internal to population, and a fundamental instrument in its government" (216). This he connects especially with sexuality, as a unit that can both provide information about sexual behavior and demographics, and also a unit that helps to instill discipline. This connected directly to the importance Foucault described in The History of Sexuality, as it is a cross-roads between individual discipline and processes of population, etc. I think the concept of governmentality served to better illustrate his ideas on bio-power and sexuality in the previous readings.
At the end of the lecture and as a nice transition to Deleuze's article, Foucault talks about "The excessive value attributed to the problem of the state" that "renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied" (220). Thus, the state is not as unified and singularly powerful as one (especially one advocating revolution) might suppose. It is here that we are reminded how governmentality fits into Foucault's overall goal in reevaluating all of these traditions: to better understand the relations of power that take place in our everyday lives and to use this understanding to our benefit. Deleuze takes on the same purpose with regards to control societies, saying "It's not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons" (178). These new weapons will come from an analysis of the fluid ways in which power manifests itself, marketing influences us, and businesses and education operate. This seems to take Foucault's analysis one step further, applying it to trends occurring 30 years later. However, I feel uneasy about this article and I do not really know how to explain it. There is something in me that simply does not acknowledge the power Deleuze wants to fight. It seems to me that these new fluid institutions do have an influence on us, but our society recognizes and studies these influences and we seem to be generally well aware of it. This may just be that the ten years from the article until now have revealed the way these processes work. Also, it seems to me that the ways in which our behavior is influenced is relatively minor in comparison to disciplinary societies, and that he talks a lot about superficial levels of control. Any feedback on this would help clarify my unsure ideas about this.
One aspect that caught my interest was the tension Foucault highlights between sovereignty and the art of government, as the latter did not simply replace the latter. He writes, "instead, given that such an art now existed and was spreading, it involved an attempt to see what juridical and institutional form, what foundation in the law, could be given to the sovereignty that characterizes a state" (218). As I was reading this I thought of something like the utilitarian ideas in contrast to the social contract theories. Whereas the former developed an idea of the legitimacy and form of sovereignty abstractly, the latter seem to take the same type of maximization and intensification of desired ends, and to build a system of government off of this. Am I reading this correctly, and is this part of what Foucault is describing?
Another aspect I found interesting was Foucault's analysis of the transition of the family unit from the model of government to "an element internal to population, and a fundamental instrument in its government" (216). This he connects especially with sexuality, as a unit that can both provide information about sexual behavior and demographics, and also a unit that helps to instill discipline. This connected directly to the importance Foucault described in The History of Sexuality, as it is a cross-roads between individual discipline and processes of population, etc. I think the concept of governmentality served to better illustrate his ideas on bio-power and sexuality in the previous readings.
At the end of the lecture and as a nice transition to Deleuze's article, Foucault talks about "The excessive value attributed to the problem of the state" that "renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied" (220). Thus, the state is not as unified and singularly powerful as one (especially one advocating revolution) might suppose. It is here that we are reminded how governmentality fits into Foucault's overall goal in reevaluating all of these traditions: to better understand the relations of power that take place in our everyday lives and to use this understanding to our benefit. Deleuze takes on the same purpose with regards to control societies, saying "It's not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons" (178). These new weapons will come from an analysis of the fluid ways in which power manifests itself, marketing influences us, and businesses and education operate. This seems to take Foucault's analysis one step further, applying it to trends occurring 30 years later. However, I feel uneasy about this article and I do not really know how to explain it. There is something in me that simply does not acknowledge the power Deleuze wants to fight. It seems to me that these new fluid institutions do have an influence on us, but our society recognizes and studies these influences and we seem to be generally well aware of it. This may just be that the ten years from the article until now have revealed the way these processes work. Also, it seems to me that the ways in which our behavior is influenced is relatively minor in comparison to disciplinary societies, and that he talks a lot about superficial levels of control. Any feedback on this would help clarify my unsure ideas about this.
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